Post-HIPC growth dynamics in Sub-Saharan Africa by Bayraktar, Nihal & Fofack, Hippolyte
Policy Research Working Paper 5924





Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network


















































































































dProduced by the Research Support Team
Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy Research Working Paper 5924
Access to debt relief under the Highly Indebted Poor 
Country Initiative enhanced the growth performance 
across Sub-Saharan Africa, especially in the subset of 
debt-ridden low-income countries. Over the past few 
years, these Completion Point countries have enjoyed 
significantly higher investments and growth rates, 
primarily fueled by the expanding fiscal space of the 
post-Highly Indebted Poor Country Initiative era. They 
are also weathering the adverse effects of the global 
crisis much better than their non-Highly Indebted 
Poor Country Initiative counterparts. Despite these 
growth rebounds, the region is not likely to meet the 
Millennium Development Goals, however. Long-term 
growth projections from a simple macroeconomic model, 
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which is applied to Ethiopia, suggest that prospects 
for reversing the widening income gaps with other 
regions of the developing world are limited. Under 
the baseline scenario, assuming current growth trends, 
the estimates show that it could take more than five 
decades for per capita real income to double in Ethiopia. 
However, even these gloomy prospects are likely to be 
undermined by the looming risk of another sovereign 
debt crisis. In effect, the experiments show that lowering 
interest rates on external debt would not bridge the 
widening income gap with other regions of the world, 
unless it is accompanied by a rapid expansion of capital 
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I  Introduction 
One of the main criticisms often voiced against structural adjustment programs is the sustained increases in 
external liabilities during program implementation in the majority of countries in the developing world 
(Parfitt and Riley, 1989; Easterly, 2002). Across Sub-Saharan Africa, the debt burden of adjustments has 
been even heavier, with the stock of external liabilities growing to unsustainable levels (Nafziger, 1993; 
Elbadawi et al., 1997). In effect, expressed as a percentage of exports, the average stock of external debt 
increased continuously across low-income countries in the region, rising from less than 50 percent in the 
mid-1970s to more than 250 percent by the mid-1990s in numerous countries (Boote and Thugge, 1997).
2  
The rising trend of external liabilities during the implementation of adjustment programs throughout Sub -
Saharan Africa reflects both persistence of large structural deficits, especially balance of payments defici ts, 
and increasing reliance on external financing to close the financing gap.  Indeed, in order to secure a 
continuously stable stream of resource flows in a context of fiscal and balance -of-payment crises, most 
countries had to avoid falling into arrears.  In practice, in the absence of domestic capital markets,  the 
dreadful near-default option illustrated by a build-up of arrears was often aborted by further increases in the 
stock of sovereign debt owed to external creditors, particularly in countries with limited fiscal space.  
Over time, the sustained accumulation of external liabilities resulted in debt overhang, when the level of 
external debt became unsustainable (Elbadawi et al., 1997; Pattillo et al., 2002).
3 Nevertheless, even before 
the debt-overhang status of countries, the costs and adverse effects of rising external liabilities were already 
hard felt across the region. Particularly affected were low -income and conflict-affected countries where 
public and private investment rates fell to all-time low levels (Akyuz and Gore, 2001).  
The large scale of external liabilities acted as a deterrent and disincentive to private capital accumulation, 
especially as rational and risk -averse investors built into their expectations potential increases in taxes to  
service pre-existing debts. The adverse effects of debt overhang on public investments were also direct, as 
countries that faced severe revenue shortfalls often leaned on public capital expenditure programs, drawing 
on the fact that the benefits of public investments, especially infrastructure projects, have been spread over a 
longer term horizon (Bayraktar and Fofack, 2007; Ayogu, 2007).
4 
Against this backdrop, debt cancellation under the Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) Initiative emerged 
as a salutary option to broaden the fiscal space. For completion point countries, it reduced interest payments 
and expected tax burdens. Furthermore, the result of debt -relief-induced greater fiscal space has been the 
rise in public investments. Unlike the adjustment  era, which was essentially characterized by anemic and 
negative economic growth, the post -HIPC era has been characterized by the resumption of positive 
economic growth fueled by strong investment rates (IMF, 2009b; Kasekende et al., 2010). 
Economic growth rates across post-HIPC Completion Point countries within the region have averaged 5.0% 
over the  past decade. Despite the adverse effects of external shocks, and particularly the second -round 
effects of the 2008 global economic and financial crisis, most co untries still managed to achieve positive 
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growth rates, albeit significantly below pre-crisis projected growth averages (IMF, 2009a).
5 These potential 
benefits of debt relief for borrowing countries (in terms of economic growth) suggest that most highly 
indebted poor countries within the region might indeed have been located on the wrong side of the debt 
Laffer curve, meaning that higher debt has been hurting economic growth. 
However, in addition to the exposure to external shocks, post -HIPC growth rates have also suffered from 
excess growth volatility, reflecting the rather anemic nature of the growth process. The observed volatility is 
likely to affect long-run growth and, more generally, prospects for meeting the first millennium development 
goals of halving poverty by 2015 in the region. At the same time, external debt figures have shown a 
renewed increasing trend in a number of countr ies, with a rapid deterioration of HIPCs’ debt-threshold 
indicators (World Bank, 2006). This trend has raised concerns about the risks of another sovereign debt 
crisis in the post-HIPC across the region. 
This paper fills an important gap in the literature by proposing a quantitative macroeconomic model that 
captures the links between growth, foreign aid, and external debt in the post-HIPC era. The structural model 
allows one to better understand the various channels through which foreign aid and external debt may 
impact growth. One of the main features of the model is the production function that incorporates the 
effects of public capital, and the productivity of private capital and labor on output. Also significant is the 
adjustment of the balance of payment equation to account for excessive reliance on external resources to 
bridge financing gaps.  
The objective of this paper is to quantify the HIPC dividends across Sub-Saharan Africa and assess the 
potential risks associated with the renewed deterioration of external debt. The first part of the paper analyzes 
the dynamics of growth in the post-HIPC era. The second part draws on a standard macroeconomic model 
that accounts for financing of deficits and debt structure in the post-HIPC to assess long-run growth. The 
model is applied to Ethiopia. The baseline simulation of the model produces slow growth and accumulating 
external debt if current economic conditions continue as they are. Baseline projections are constructed, after 
which some experiments are run to explore the growth implications of higher foreign aid and/or lower 
interest payments on foreign debt, under different scenarios. The simulation results show that the optimal 
outcome in terms of higher economic growth depends on the sustainability and size of foreign aid and the 
proportion of external assistance allocated to public investments.  
This research is undertaken at a time of the global review of progress toward the MDGs, almost a decade 
into the adoption of these goals (Go et al., 2010; Bhagwati, 2010).
6 It is motivated by the wave of euphoria 
that has accompanied the resurgence of growth in the post -HIPC across Sub-Saharan Africa. In effect, 
global experts not only in development institutions, but also in academia have gone as far as likening Africa’s 
recent positive growth rates to those that have transformed Asian emerging market economies into global 
players (Sala-i-Martin and Pinkovskiy, 2010; Devarajan and Shetty, 2010).  
Although the success of Asian emerging market economies, most notably illustrated by large current account 
surpluses, has been predicated on major structural shifts in production possibility frontiers and industrial 
transformation,  most  African  countries remain  excessively  dependent  on  natural  resources  and  primary 
commodity exports (Fofack, 2010)]. Hence, the paper also attempts to shed some light on the nature and 
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6 On the occasion of that tenth anniversary of the millennium declaration, the latest issue of IMF’s Finance & Development—Restoring Hope: 
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quality of growth, contrasting stylized facts underpinning the growth process across the two regions. Our 
results may have implications for the extent to which African countries can enter the virtuous cycle of long-
run growth enjoyed by Asian emerging market economies.  
In  effect,  contrasting  the  growth  and  welfare  performance  of  Asia’s  emerging  market  economies,  the 
baseline projection of the model for Ethiopia suggests that under the current post-HIPC growth rates, 
average per capita real income will not double, even decades after the MDG target date of 2015. Worse still, 
a renewed deterioration of external debt thresholds in the post-HIPC era has emerged as a key constraint to 
the expanding fiscal space that released the critical resources needed for increased capital expenditure in 
support of growth and economic development.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section analyzes the dynamics of growth in the 
post-HIPC era across Sub-Saharan Africa. In particular, it contrasts the growth performance between HIPC-
Completion Point countries and non-HIPCs. It also contrasts Asian emerging market economies with Sub-
Saharan  African  countries.  Section  III  proposes  a  macroeconomic  framework  for  assessing  the  HIPC 
dividends measured in terms of economic growth. In Section IV, the proposed model is applied to Ethiopia 
to quantify the HIPC dividends (and risks associated with resurgence of another debt cycle), and particularly 
estimates long-run growth and average income under certain assumptions. The last section concludes. 
  
II  Dynamics of Growth of African Economies in the Post-HIPC Era 
Though highly volatile, Sub-Saharan Africa’s growth spells can be divided into three main episodes: the pre-
1974 oil crisis, the adjustment era which started in the mid-1970s and ran through the 1990s, and the post-
HIPC era after the 1990s. The first episode running through the 1974 oil shock can also be labeled as the 
immediate  post-independence  era.  Existing  empirical  records  on  that  episode  point  to  a  rather  strong 
economic performance, as average growth rates enjoyed by African countries exceeded 3% over the period 
(Maddison, 1995; Artadi and Sala-i-Martin, 2003).  
According  to  Maddison  (1995),  the  Africa  region  witnessed  a  rapid  increase  in  income  and  enjoyed  a 
relatively  large  contribution  to  global  trade  during  that  first  episode.  However,  the  relatively  good 
performance of the region largely reflected the dichotomous trade pattern of the globalization landscape 
inherited from the colonial era, and still, the relatively large contribution of primary commodity and natural 
resources to growth under that globalization landscape. While former colonies and developing countries 
specialized in exports of natural resources, advanced economies dominated the production and exports of 
manufactured goods.  
Exponential growth in manufacturing exports, however, over the past decades significantly altered these 
historical trade patterns (World Bank, 2002; Fofack, 2009).
7 Under those rapidly changing trading patterns, 
sudden growth reversals and rising internal (savings-investment) and external (balance of payments) deficits 
dominated the second growth episode. A lot has been written on Africa’s dismal growth performance during 
that episode (Easterly and Levine, 1997; Artadi and Sala-i-Martin, 2003).
8 Artadi and Sala-i-Martin (2003) 
                                                           
7 Hence, under that old dichotomous globalization landscape, Africa essentially enjoyed the benefits of its excess natural resource endowment over 
other regions. 
8 Easterly and Levine (1997) have labeled the second episode as ―Africa Growth Tragedy.‖ However, they have largely attributed the growth tragedy 
and poor economic outcomes to the politics of ethnic divisions and conflicts. 5 
 
have characterized the growth performance of the region as the ―economic tragedy of the twentieth century,‖ 
in reference to the rather long cycle of negative economic growth and falling real per capita income.  
According to these authors the region recorded negative growth rates over that period, with the most 
significant growth collapse occurring in the 1990s, when the economy contracted by more than 1.5% on 
average.  However,  contraction  was  even  more  pronounced  in  the  HIPC  subset,  with  average  growth 
declining  by  more  than  5%  during  the  same  period.  These  countries  also  recorded  significantly  lower 
investment  rates  and  larger  balance  of  payments  deficits.  In  percentage  of  GDP,  balance  of  payments 
deficits averaged 2.5% in African HIPC Completion Point countries compared with 1.9% in non-HIPCs 
between 2005 and 2009. Ultimately, the persistent and growing deficits faced by these countries motivated 
the recourse to adjustment, and largely explains the exceptional rise and disproportionally higher increase in 
external liabilities accruing to these countries up to the late 1990s (Figure 1). 
Indeed, the weak growth performance first triggered by the 1974 oil crisis was later exacerbated by recurrent 
adverse terms of trade and balance of payments crises across the region. Over time, invariance under that 
primary commodity and natural resource exports-led growth model fueled Africa’s debt crisis. The sudden 
growth reversals in the aftermath of the oil crisis revealed the high exposure of the region to negative terms 
of trade shocks (Fofack, 2010). The persistency under these adverse shocks highlighted the unsustainability 
of tying growth too heavily to natural resource exports. 
However, the gross characterization of the region’s overall growth performance as  disappointing masks 
important differences that may exist across countries. The contrast between the subset of HIPCs and non-
HIPCs shows that growth collapse was somewhat more  serious in the former.
9 Figure 2 contrasts the 
dynamics of growth in HIPCs and non-HIPCs over the last few decades. Despite the trend consistency in 
the two distributions, on average, non-HIPCs registered higher growth rates throughout the late 1990s.  
Still, the gross characterization of Sub -Saharan Africa also reflects its widening income gaps with other 
regions of the developing world. In fact, the problem is not so much that Sub -Saharan African countries 
recorded negative economic growth throughout the second episode ,  spanning two decades. Growth is 
subject to business cycles; conceivably , an output gap can be come exceedingly large during downturns. 
Instead, the reference to economic tragedy reflects the fact that other regions of the developing world were 
less affected by business cycles and recorded impressive economic performances —sustained and robust 
economic growth and global income convergence—during the same period (Singh, 2010).
10  
To further illustrate this point, Figure 3 contrasts the GDP per capita of China and African HIPCs over the 
past four decades. Since the mid-1980s, the income gap between the two sets has grown unabated, fueled by 
exponential growth in China and high growth volatility in the subset of African HIPCs  (Yueh,  2010). 
Despite the potential adverse effects of the global crisis for Asia’s export-led growth model, the growing 
income gap has persisted. According to the latest estimates, China now enjoys per capita income that is well 
over four times the average across African HIPCs, a remarkable change from the 1970s, when African 
countries had a significantly higher level of income.
11 
                                                           
9 The list of HIPCs included in the data analyses is Benin; Burkina Faso; Burundi; Cameroon; Central African Republic; Chad; Congo, Dem. Rep.; 
Congo, Rep.; Cote d'Ivoire; Ethiopia; Gambia; Ghana; Guinea; Liberia; Madagascar; Malawi; Mali; Mauritania; Mozambique; Niger; Rwanda; Sao 
Tome and Principe; Senegal; Sierra Leone; Tanzania; Uganda; and Zambia. 
10 In particular, Asia’s growth performance over the past two decades has simply been phenomenal. Emerging Asia has doubled its share of world 
trade and tripled its share of world GDP. And projections suggest that it could become the world’s largest economic region by 2030 [Singh (2010)]. 
11 Of course, in per capita terms, the income gap with other emerging market economies is even more significant (see Figure 1A in Annex). 6 
 
While much has been written on Africa’s dismal performance during the second episode, much less has been 
done to explain the persistent, if not continued, growing income gap between Sub-Saharan Africa and other 
regions of the developing world in the post-HIPC era (Oyelaran, 2007, and Newfarmer, 2009). Sub-Saharan 
Africa’s growth rates have improved somewhat, especially since countries have had access to debt relief 
(Kasekende et al., 2010). The generally positive trend across the whole region probably has been boosted by 
the  relatively  strong  growth  rates  in  HIPCs,  reflecting  the  higher  investment  rates—part  of  HIPC 
dividends—enjoyed by these countries in recent years. 
Additionally, the diverging growth path in the years following the crisis suggests that HIPC Completion 
Point countries weathered the global economic and financial downturn triggered by the U.S. subprime crisis 
much better (Rogers, 2010). The higher growth volatility in the subset of non-HIPCs, especially after the 
1990s, and persistent negative economic growth rates in the aftermath of the global downturn is in sharp 
contrast with the performance of HIPC-completion-point countries. Countries in the latter subset quickly 
reverted to pre-crisis positive growth rates (Figure 2). 
At the same time, the continued widening income gap with Asian emerging market economies in the post-
HIPC suggests that the growth rates enjoyed by these countries in recent years has been neither strong 
enough nor sustained to trigger the process of income convergence. Among several possible reasons, most 
notable is the resurgence of growth in these countries, which has not been accompanied by the type of 
structural transformation observed in Asia (Nelson and Pack, 1999; Fofack, 2010).  
In particular, Asian emerging markets have drawn on sustained accumulation of physical and human capital 
and adoption of advanced technology to raise productivity and expand the scope of manufactured goods in 
overall output.
12 The successful integration of Asian emerging market economies into the global economy—
most notably illustrated by their entry into the convergence club—has been predicated on remarkable shifts 
in production possibility frontiers and industrial output expansion, with manufacturing becoming the basis 
for long-run growth (World Bank, 2002).  
In contrast, the overwhelming majority of countries in the Sub-Saharan Africa region have continued to 
depend largely on commodity and natural resources, though the contribution of natural resources to growth 
was becoming less determinant under the new globalization landscape dominated by manufacturing exports 
and knowledge (Fofack, 2009). In the extreme cases of excess dependency on natural resources (Angola, for 
instance), proceeds from these resources accounted for more than 90% of exports and 50% of GDP. 
Reflecting  that  invariance  in  the  sources  of  growth,  the  taxonomy  of  African  economies  remains 
fundamentally shaped by the extent of natural resources.  
 
III  Analytical Framework 
The analytical framework is derived from the model developed in Agénor, Bayraktar, and El Aynaoui (2008). 
The proposed framework investigates the growth path of countries after debt cancellation, and conversely 
the adverse effects of rising external liabilities on growth. The expected impact of debt cancellation on the 
economy goes through increased public savings and government revenues, largely owing to lower interest 
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Some  of  these  policies  have  served  as  catalysts  for  foreign  direct  investment  by  emphasizing  saving  and  investment  spending,  especially  in 
infrastructure and education, and the adoption of advanced technology. 7 
 
payments on foreign debt. To understand the effects of lower interest payments or higher foreign aid, we 
consider different options in allocation of additional savings accruing to governments in the post-HIPC era. 
In the model, these savings or resources are alternatively channeled to expand public investment, public 
consumption, or both in an equally weighted scheme.  
One of the main features of the model is the production function that introduces the combined effects of 
public capital, private capital, and labor on output. In the model, the domestic good is assumed to be an 
imperfect  substitute  for  foreign  good.  The  price  of  domestic  good  is  determined  through  equilibrium 
between supply and demand. The model also accounts for changes in relative prices. In addition, it explicitly 
captures the link between additional public resources and public investment, which is essential to analyze the 
possible impacts of debt cancellation on growth.  
The discussion of the framework starts with the production function. Then, the components of aggregate 
demand (consumption, investment, and imports) are introduced. The government budget constraint and the 
balance of payments follow. The equilibrium condition of the market for domestic goods and the savings-
investment balance are presented last.  
 
III.1. Production side and labor 
The model assumes that a single homogeneous good is produced domestically, and imperfectly substitutable 
to an imported good. The production requires labor (LAB), private capital (KP), and public capital (KG):   
Y = f(LAB, KP, KG), 
where Y is production of domestic goods. The public capital stock is introduced in the production function 
because this capital stock is essential to raise the productivity of private capital and labor (Ayogu, 2007; 
Agénor et al., 2008). The model adopts a two-stage nested CES production structure to explicitly account 
for differences in the degree of substitutability between private factors of production and public capital. At 
the first level, the supply of labor (LAB) and the stock of private capital (KG) produce the composite input 
(KL): 
KL = AKL•[βKL•LAB-ρKL + (1 - βKL)KP-ρKL]-1/ρKL                                (1) 
where AKL > 0 (capturing technological improvements), βKL ∈ (0,1), and σKL = 1/(1+ρKL) denotes the 
elasticity of substitution between LAB and KP. At the second level, the composite input, KL, and public 
capital, KG, are combined to produce domestic output: 
Y = AY•[βY•KL-ρY + (1 - βY)(KG) -ρY]-1/ρY                                      (2) 
where  AY  >  0  (capturing  technological  improvements),  βY  ∈  (0,1),  and  σY  =  1/(1+ρY)  denotes  the 
elasticity  of  substitution  between  KL  and  KG.  This  domestic  output  is  either  exported  or  consumed 
domestically:  
PY•Y = PD•DOM + PX•X                                                    (3) 
where PD is the domestic price of domestically produced goods, PX is the price of exported goods, and PY 
is the net output price. It is assumed that the allocation of domestic output between exports and domestic 8 
 
consumption follows a constant elasticity of transformation function. Based on this function, the allocation 
of output between exports and domestic sales satisfies: 
X/DOM = {(PX/PD)•[(1 - βD)/βD]}σD                                         (4) 
where βD ∈  (0,1) (the share of exports) and σD = 1/(D-1), with 1 < σD <  measuring the elasticity of 
transformation between exports and domestic sales.  
Labor is assumed to be growing at a constant rate, n: 
LAB = (1+n)LAB-1                                                            (5) 
III.2. Households 
The  representative  household  earns  gross  domestic  product,  GDP,  and  unrequited  net  transfers  from 
abroad, UTR$:  
YTOT = GDP + ER•UTR$                                                 (6) 
where ER is the official nominal exchange rate. 
Disposable income (YDISP) is defined as total income earned (YTOT) minus taxes paid (TAX): 
YDISP = YTOT - TAX                                                 (7) 
Private consumption (CP) is calculated by subtracting savings (s is the saving rate) from disposable income, 
YDISP: 
CP = (1 - s)•YDISP/PQ                                              (8) 
where PQ is the composite price of goods sold domestically, which will be defined later. 
Private investment is assumed to be a function of the growth rate, Y/Y-1, public capital stock (KG) and 
foreign external debt (ER*FdebtG): 
PQ*IP/GDP = f(Y/Y-1, (PQ*KG/GDP), (ER*FdebtG/GDP))                          (9) 
The accumulation of the private capital stock is private investment in period t-1 plus the non-depreciated 
private capital stock from t-1: 
KP = IP-1 + (1 - ʴP)KP-1                                                    (10) 
It is assumed that it takes a year to make private investment productive. 
 
III.3. Government 
Government revenues are derived from taxes and foreign assistance either in the form of loans or grants. 
The government spends the derived income on goods and services, including public investment. It also pays 9 
 
interest on loans. Given that domestic sources of government deficit financing are very limited, it is assumed 
that the budget deficit is financed mainly through foreign borrowing. 
The government budget balance (GBAL) is calculated by adding revenue (REV) and aid (AID$) netted out 
of total government expenditure (GTOT): 
GBAL = REV + ER•AID$ - GTOT.                                                     (11) 
Foreign aid is assumed to be a constant share of GDP, where ER•AID$ = GDP* θAID. 
Total government expenditure includes government current spending (CG), public investment (IG) and 
interest  payment  (RG*•ER•FdebtG-1)  on  external  debt,  and  interest  payment  (RDG*•DdebtG-1)  on 
domestic debt: 
GTOT = PQ•(CG+IG) + RG*•ER•FdebtG-1 + RDG*•DdebtG-1                             (12) 
where FdebtG is the stock of foreign public debt, RG* the interest rate on that debt, and RDG is the interest 
rate on domestic debt. Interest rates are assumed to be exogenous. 
Government revenue is derived from taxes, TAX, and non-tax income, NTAX (public enterprises and 
returns on investment incomes):  
REV = TAX + NTAX.                                                               (13) 
Current public spending is taken as a constant share of GDP: 
PQ•CG = θCG•GDP,                                                                  (14) 
where θCG is the constant share of current spending in GDP. 
Public investment (IG) is also assumed to be constant as a share of GDP: 
PQR·IG = θIG·GDP,                                                               (15) 
where θIG is the share of public investment in GDP.   
The public capital stock (KG) grows through the accumulation process, adding public investment in t-1 to 
non-depreciated public capital stock in period t-1: 
KG = IG-1 + (1 - ʴG)KG-1 .                                                        (16) 
where ʴG is the depreciation rate. The capital accumulation process assumes that it takes a year to make 
public investment productive.  
Given that domestic financial resources are very limited, the budget deficit is assumed to be financed by 
foreign transfers, FG (in U.S. dollars): 
FG = (- GBAL)/ER.                                                              (17) 
Public external debt accumulates, adding foreign transfers in period t to the debt stock in the previous 
period t-1: 10 
 
FdebtG = FG + FdebtG-1.                                                   (18A) 
Assuming that the government can also borrow in the domestic financial markets (domestic debt, DdebtG), 
and it accumulates as follows, where DG is new borrowing in domestic markets, added to the stock of 
domestic debt: 
DdebtG = DG + DdebtG-1 .                                                  (18B) 
 
III.4. Balance of payments 
The balance of payments includes trade balance, interest payment, unrequited transfers, foreign aid, and the 
change in official reserves: 
  PX*•X - PM*•M - RG*•FdebtG-1 + UTR$ + AID$ + FG - RES = 0                       (19) 
Official reserves are kept as a constant multiple RM of current nominal months-of- imports: 
RES = RM PM*•M/12                                                              (20) 
 
III.5. Market equilibrium and prices 
The market equilibrium assumes the equivalence of supply (Q) and demand: 
Q = CP + CG + IP + IG                                                           (21) 
The supply of goods to the domestic market is determined through a combination of imports and domestic 
sales of the domestic goods, DOM. This function produces the following first-order condition: 
M/DOM = {(PD/PM)•[(1 - βDM)/βDM]}σDM,                                        (22) 
where βDM  (0,1), and DM = 1/(1+DM) is the elasticity of substitution between the domestic and 
imported goods, and PM is the domestic price of imported products.  
The price charged in the domestic markets (PQ) is determined through a function combining the price of 
the domestically produced goods and the price of imported goods: 
PQ = [βDM•PD1-σDM + (1 - βDM)•PM1-σDM] 1/(1-σDM) .                                 (23) 
The equilibrium price of domestically produced goods sold in the domestic market is defined as  
PDEQ = (PQ•Q - PM•M)/DOM.                                               (24) 
The price of the domestic good, PD, adjusts gradually to its equilibrium value: 
PD = PD •PDEQ + (1 - PD)•PD-1                                            (25) 
where PD  (0,1) measures the speed of adjustment. 11 
 
The domestic price of exported goods (PX) is given by 
PX = ER•PX*,                                                               (26) 
where ER is the nominal exchange rate and PX* the world price of exports (assumed exogenous). 
The domestic price of imported goods is: 
PM = ER•PM*,                                                              (27) 
where PM* the world price of exports (assumed exogenous). 
The price of output is assumed to be numéraire,: 
PY = 1.                                                                  (28) 
III.6. Gross domestic product 
Nominal gross domestic product is the summation of private consumption (CP), public consumption (CG), 
public investment (IG), private investment (IP), all converted in nominal terms by multiplying them by PQ, 
and adding net exports to the summation (ER•(PX*•X – PM*•M)): 
GDP = PQ•(CP + CG + IP + IG) + ER•(PX*•X – PM*•M).                              (29) 
 
 IV  Simulation Results 
The model is applied to Ethiopia, one of the highly indebted poor countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Ethiopia 
reached the HIPC Completion Point in 2004. Following that accession to debt relief, the ratio of net present 
value of its debt to exports declined from 284 at Decision Point to 150 after the Completion Point (World 
Bank, 2006).  
This section is divided into three parts: the first one deals with the calibration of parameters underlying the 
proposed model. Then, the baseline simulation is discussed, followed by policy experiments. 
IV.1 Calibration of parameters and projection of exogenous variables: Most of the parameters used in 
the simulations are taken from Agénor et al. (2008), because their model has been applied to the same 
country. Furthermore, by extending the application of their results, we assume that the parameters are 
relatively stable over time. The values of the parameters are given in Table 1A in the Annex. The behavioral 
equations  are  based  on  econometric  regressions  obtained  using  Ethiopia’s  observable  variables  in  the 
simulations. Equation (9) provides the estimate of private capital accumulation expressed as a percentage of 
GDP in real terms. The estimated parameters for Equation (9) are: 
PQ*IP/GDP = (0.03*Growth of Y + 0.3*(KG*PQ/GDP) - 0.003*(FdebtG.ER/GDP)). 
Given  that  the  base  year  is  2008  (because  most  complete  observable  data  belong  to  that  year),  the 
projections are done for the period 2009-2030. The population growth rate (n) is taken equal to its 2008 12 
 
value, which is 2.26%.
13 Given that n is exogenous, POP is projected as POP = POP-1*(1+n). The labor 
force is assumed to be growing at the same rate. Since PY is numéraire, it is projected as 1. Interest rates 
(RG*) are taken equal to 1 percent, assuming loans to low-income countries are mainly concessional.  
We assumed that there is no change in terms of trade throughout the simulation process.
14 Thus the rates of 
change in both PM* and PX* are projected such that the growth rates of these two variables are equal. Tax 
revenues are based on private production and income projections. The effective tax rate is approximately 
10.4 percent of GDP. The share of domestic borrowing, θDB, is assumed to be constant at 1 percent of 
GDP, given the small size of domestic financial markets. The share of foreign aid in GDP (θAID) takes its 
value in 2008. In the baseline simulation, it is projected at the constant rate (9%), but in experiments it takes 
different values.  
The share of current public spending (θCG) is taken as 23% of GDP, which is the 2008 value. The baseline 
simulation values are derived from the estimated share of public spending in 2008. However, that share takes 
different values in the experiments. Another important variable in the model is public investment. The share 
of public investment (θIG) is assumed to be equal to its 2008 value, which is 5.9% of GDP. Similar to current 
government spending, public investment is also assumed to remain constant in percent of GDP throughout 
the projections and taking different values in the experiments.   
Although most exogenous variables are projected outside the model, a small number of exogenous variables 
are  projected  within  the  simulation  program  because  they  are  assumed  to  be  in  constant  shares  of 
endogenous variables. Given the shares presented above, domestic borrowing (DB), foreign aid (AID$), 
foreign borrowing (FP), transfer from abroad (UTR$), current public spending (CG), and public investment 
(IG) are all in constant shares of GDP, and the projections of these variables are based on simulated GDP 
values between 2009 and 2030.  
Another important specification is the construction of public and private capital stocks. Because historical 
data series for capital stocks are not available for Ethiopia, the initial capital stocks are calculated assuming 
that initial public and private capital stocks are zero in 1980. Then the stocks are calibrated in the following 
years such that KPt = (1- ʴP)*KPt-1 + IPt-1 where ʴP = 4% is the depreciation rate, IP is real investment, and 
KP private capital stock.
15 The public capital stocks are calibrated following the same procedure. But the 
depreciation rate in this case is taken as 2.5%.  
IV.2 Baseline projection: Simulation results are classified into two main categories: baseline projection and 
experiments. The baseline projection shows how Ethiopia’s economy would evolve if current economic 
trends continue into the future.16 Under that assumption, exogenous variables are  projected to remain as 
close as possible to the prevailing economic conditions throughout the simulation. For example, there is no 
shock to terms of trade, or to private or public investment, all of which can be important drivers of growth 
and are highly affected by business cycles. The use of 2008 as base period requires making a certain number 
of assumptions for the policy and other exogenous variables over the period 2009-2030.  
                                                           
13 The average growth rate of population in Sub-Saharan Africa was 2.3% on average in 2008.  
14 However, this may be a rather strong assumption, especially in light of the recent global econ omic and financial crisis. Most  primary-
commodity-dependent countries were affected during the second round of the global downturn via the terms of trade channels [IMF 
(2009a)].   
15 For depreciation rates, see Agenor et al. (2008) and Bayraktar and Fofack (2007).   
16 It should be noted that the results need to be interpreted carefully, since they are based on a simulation model with a certa in number of 
assumptions on parameterization.  13 
 
Table 2A in the Annex shows the baseline simulation results from the calibrated model. The results are 
investigated  in  turn  for  the  external  sector,  government  sector,  prices  and  exchange  rates,  and  some 
additional items of interest. The external sector shows an improvement of the current account balance, 
largely due to a rapid depreciation of the local currency. Private unrequited transfers are assumed to be 
constant in percent of GDP. Net income flows declined, due mainly to increasing interest payments on 
rising external debt. The capital account projection declines slightly, despite increasing external borrowing 
needs following the deterioration of the trade balance.  
Similarly, items under the government sector (second section of Table 2A) are expressed in percent of GDP. 
Total tax revenue is on a declining trend, owing in part to falling domestic production and income. Since the 
tax base is not growing at the desired level, the government is unable to collect enough revenue to finance its 
expenses, even though the effective tax rate is almost constant throughout the projections. The share of 
non-tax revenues is constant at 6.5% of GDP. Current and capital expenditures are both assumed to be 
constant at 23% and 5.9% of GDP (their actual values in the baseline year), respectively.  
Even though the interest rate on foreign debt is assumed to be low, at 1%, interest payments are increasing 
continuously throughout the simulation process due to rising stock of external debt. The fiscal balance stays 
negative around 3.5% of GDP due in part to persistence under a narrow tax base. In a context of limited 
financial deepening and domestic financial markets, only 1 percentage point of this deficit is assumed to be 
financed domestically; as a result, the government of Ethiopia borrows externally on concessional terms to 
close the financing gap. 
The third section of Table 2A focuses on price and exchange rate movements and related items. Note that 
the composite price index is trending upward while foreign exchange rate declines, reflecting a nominal 
depreciation. As expected, the depreciation should lead to an improvement of the trade balance following 
the decrease of imported goods. The last section of Table 2A (additional items of interest) shows a slight 
increase in the growth rates of real GDP per capita, reflecting low savings and investment rates. In effect, at 
0.9% of GDP, private savings are very low in Ethiopia, even by developing countries’ standards.  
Interestingly, the ratio of external debt to GDP increases markedly, mainly due to persistently large fiscal 
deficits in the post-HIPC era. Paradoxically, one of the main objectives of the HIPC Initiative was to reduce 
the stock of external debt and interest payments accruing to low-income countries, ultimately averting the 
risk of another sovereign debt crisis. On the basis of the projections, debt cancellation alone may not bring a 
permanent solution to the external debt burden confronting the majority of low-income countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa. As governments cannot raise more tax revenues or borrow domestically to bridge the ever-
growing financing gap, they are naturally inclined to rely more and more on external sources of financing.  
The projection for Ethiopia shows that the share of external debt in GDP is expected to rise from 18%in 
2011 to 66% in 2030.
17 This impressive accumulation of projected external liabilities (at least according to 
projections) in the post -HIPC will result in higher external interest payments, ultimately curtailing the 
number of resources that the government can deploy to support growth and poverty reduction. 
Another interesting feature of the model, which has significant policy implications, is its  ability to estimate 
the number of years it would take under the baseline scenario to double real per capita income in Ethiopia. 
                                                           
17 For Ethiopia, World Bank (2006) estimates the net value of external debt in percent of GDP as 29% in 2010 under the worst-case scenario. The 
estimation is based on the assumption of less favorable terms of borrowing. But given that the definition of debt and the estimation methodologies 
are different from what is presented here, they are not comparable.   14 
 
Assuming that the Ethiopian economy would continue to grow at an average rate of 0.8% per annum over 
the projected period, it would take about 86 years for real GDP per capita to double (see Table 1). This 
result suggests that Ethiopia may be locked into a vicious poverty trap, unless a massive inflow of resources 
creates the fiscal space required for sustained investments and economic growth. The next sub-section 
explores the potential growth and welfare benefits of such a ―big push‖ option. 
IV.3 Policy experiments: The experiments are designed to generate additional government revenues that 
can be allocated to current spending, public investment, or a combination of both. It is assumed that the 
additional revenues are derived from lower interest payments on external debt following relief under the 
HIPC  Initiative  or  from  a  substantial  increase  in  capital  inflows  in  the  form  of  foreign  aid.  These 
experiments are compared against the baseline projections discussed above, with the growth and welfare 
effects measured by the percentage deviations from the baseline. The focus of policy experiments is to assess 
the growth effects of improved fiscal space in a context of reduced interest payments on external debt.  
Analytically, the potential growth and welfare effects of lower interest payments on external debt mainly 
operate  through  the  fiscal  channel,  especially  to  the  extent  that  increased  fiscal  space  and  government 
revenues could raise the prospects for investments in support of growth. However, even in a context of 
improved  fiscal  space,  growth  may  not  automatically  follow.  Growth  prospects  are  influenced  by  the 
composition of public spending as well as the efficiency in the allocation of additional resources from debt 
relief (Gupta et al., 2005; Fofack, 2010). Three different experiments—reflecting the various forms of public 
spending allocation—are used to investigate the growth and welfare effects of lower interest payments on 
external debt.   
The current level of interest payments on external debt owed to external creditors by the government of 
Ethiopia is about 1% of GDP, reflecting the disproportionately large share of concessional financing of its 
external liabilities. Although highly hypothetical, especially given the already low interest rate on its external 
debt, the first experiment explores the potential growth and welfare implications of an even lower interest 
rate. It should be noted that given the rapidly growing scale of external debt in the baseline projections, the 
drop in interest rates may significantly increase public savings, which can then be allocated toward increased 
public spending in the form of current and capital expenditure. 
The first experiment assumes a 50% reduction in interest payments on external debt in the post-HIPC era, 
with the totality of additional revenues fully allocated to current spending. The model is used to assess the 
implications of that fully current expenditure on long-term growth projections. Figure 4 provides the results 
of this first experiment in the form of a percentage deviation from the baseline scenario. Note that under 
this first experiment, per capita GDP growth rate increases steadily, largely on account of rising government 
spending. 
These results may also be viewed as incidence analysis of public spending allocation on long-run growth. In 
that context, several alternative scenarios are also considered in the deployment of additional revenues. Most 
notably and contrasting the fully current expenditure option, the totality of additional revenues from lower 
interest payments on external debt is allocated to the financing of public investments. The incidence of 
public spending allocation under this second alternative is more significant and consistently superior to the 
fully current expenditure option throughout the entire simulation period (Figure 4). Indeed, the absolute 
deviations from the baseline are much larger.  15 
 
The  potential  growth  and  welfare  returns  under  this  hypothetical  scenario  are  equally  significant.  In 
particular,  the  simulations  show  that  the  full  allocation  of  additional  revenues  to  capital  expenditure 
expansion could result in over .44 percentage points deviation from the baseline, suggesting that growth rate 
would be .44 percentage points higher. Predictably, the long-run incidence of public spending allocation on 
growth is slightly lower for the intermediate option, which allocates the additional revenues from lower 
interest payments equally to both recurrent spending and public investments (Figure 4). 
Despite  the  apparent  positive  incidence  of  public  spending  on  long-run  growth  under  the  different 
allocation options, the overall welfare and income effects remain very low, reflecting in part, the modest 
level of additional revenues and, most important, the poor initial conditions in Ethiopia—the low level of 
income per capita and high growth volatility (World Bank, 2003; UNECA, 2007; Go and Page, 2008). Under 
the best-case scenario, when the totality of additional savings is allocated to public investments, it could take 
about 70 years for per capita income to double, just about 16 years lower than under the baseline scenario 
(Table 1).    
The second set of experiments explores the growth and welfare effects under a ―big push‖ option—massive 
inflows of resources because of rapid increase in foreign aid. In the absence of a structural transformation of 
the production possibility frontiers and hence persistency under a narrow tax base, Ethiopia remains highly 
dependent on foreign aid, which reached 9% of GDP in 2008 (Alemu, 2009).
18 The model estimates the 
magnitude of growth and welfare incidence of hypothetical increased in foreign aid under different public 
spending allocation options. Simulations show that GDP per capita growth increases proportionally with 
foreign aid (see Figure 4). These results are consistent with findings in the literature. Foreign aid and external 
indebtedness is generally thought to be growth enhancing (Pattillo et al., 2002). 
Contrasting the fully recurrent and capital expenditure expansion options, our experiment shows that the 
largest gains in terms of per capita GDP growth are associated with the latter option. In particular and 
irrespective of the scale of additional capital inflows (foreign aid), the potential growth and welfare returns 
from the fully capital expenditure expansion option are consistently higher. When foreign aid hypothetically 
increases from its current level of 9% of GDP to  about 15%, per capita GDP growth rises consistently, 
exceeding the baseline by more than 4 percentage points by 2030 (Figure 5: Panel A).  
Even when the hypothetical increased inflows of external assistance in the form of foreign aid (in the 
magnitude of 15% of GDP) is fully allocated to current spending, the potential returns in terms of growth 
and welfare remain significant, though markedly much smaller. Indeed, under this second alternative option, 
GDP per capita remains on a consistent growth path, and  is projected to exceed the baseline by at most 3 
percentage points in 2030 (Figure 5: Panel A).  
Likewise, even when the hypothetical increase in flow of foreign aid is reduced to 12% of GDP, the 
potential growth and welfare returns remain significant and  rise consistently throughout the simulation 
period (Figure 5: Panel B). However, irrespective of the public spending allocation options (fully recurrent, 
capital, or both), the absolute deviations of per capita GDP growth is consistently lower (below 3% of  
GDP). Furthermore and consistent with the earlier simulations, which assume a much higher level of foreign 
aid, the growth target is also lower under the fully current expenditure option. In particular, per capita GDP 
is projected to exceed the baseline by less than 1 percentage point by 2030. The intermediate scenario, which 
                                                           
18 At about 9% of GDP, foreign aid is close to historical trends. In effect, over the past decade (1999-2008), foreign aid as a percentage of GDP has 
averaged 8.6%. 16 
 
equally  splits  the  hypothetical  increase  in  foreign  aid  between  current  and  capital  expenditure,  is  also 
significant and better than the fully current expenditure expansion option.  
The income and welfare benefits of the hypothetical ―big push‖ model are also significant under the fully 
capital expenditure expansion option. In particular, where foreign aid rises to 15% of GDP and remains high 
throughout the simulation period, and with additional revenues channeled to finance public investment, it 
would take about two decades for per capita real GDP to double—over 50 years faster than under the 
baseline scenario (see Table 1). The results are also impressive under the fully current expenditure option, 
though remarkably lower than under the sustained accumulation of the capital stock option. Under the fully 
current expenditure option, per capita real GDP could double in about five decades.    
The much higher incidence of the fully capital expenditure expansion option over the alternative current 
spending  option  is  expected.  Under  the  well-established  complementarity  argument,  public  investment 
expansion  has  the  potential  to  raise  the  level  of  private  capital  stock,  and  then  directly  impact  private 
production and aggregate output on the supply side. In contrast, the fully current expenditure option has a 
limited impact on the economy because it affects private production indirectly, specifically through the 
demand side. Moreover, it is exposed to large leakages, especially in primary commodity countries, which in 
the absence of economic diversification rely heavily on imports of final consumption and manufactured 
goods.    
 
V  Conclusion 
This paper analyzes the dynamics of growth in the post-HIPC era in Sub-Saharan Africa. It is written at a 
time of a growing wave of euphoria where the resumption of positive economic growth rates—fueled in 
part by favorable terms of trade and expanding fiscal space—have led scholars and policymakers alike to 
liken Africa’s recent performances to the impressive growth rates and economic transformation enjoyed by 
Asian emerging market economies over the past decades. The paper is also written at a time when Sub-
Saharan African post-HIPC Completion Point countries have been witnessing a renewed deterioration of 
their external debt threshold indicators, a path that could have significant adverse effects on macroeconomic 
stability and long-run growth.  
Against this backdrop, the first part of the paper contrasts the growth performance of African HIPCs with 
that of Asian emerging market economies. In spite of growth resumption in the subset of African HIPCs, 
their overall performance in terms of income growth and welfare pales in comparison to that of Asian 
emerging market economies. The remarkable contrast is most notably reflected in the continued widening 
income gap between the two sets of countries. In particular, since the late 1990s, the income gap between 
Asian emerging market economies and African post-HIPC completion point countries has grown unabated. 
In addition to contrasting income trends in the short run, the paper uses a simple macroeconomic model 
that accounts for the financing of the deficit and the external debt profile of the post-HIPC era to assess 
long-run  growth  prospects  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa.  The  policy  experiments,  which  compare  long-run 
estimates with baseline projections, are derived from the model to estimate the potential growth and welfare 
returns under certain hypothetical assumptions, including reduction of interest payments on external debt 
and full allocation of additional revenues from increased foreign aid to either capital or current expenditure 
expansion.  17 
 
The model is applied to Ethiopia, one of the post-HIPC Completion Point countries in the region. Baseline 
projections  from  the  model  do  indeed  point  to  income  stagnation  in  real  terms.  They  also  reveal  the 
persistence of large fiscal deficits and deterioration of external debt indicators. In effect, on the basis of 
these baseline projections, the share of external debt in GDP could rise from 18% in the immediate post-
HIPC completion point to 66% by 2030, ceteris paribus. Similarly and consistent with the baseline estimates, 
the long-term projections of per capita real income support the income stagnation hypothesis. Under the 
current growth path, it could take more than eight decades for per capita real income to double in Ethiopia.  
However, policy experiments that assess the incidence of public spending allocation on long-run growth 
under the hypothetically reduced interest payments on external debt and/or exceptionally increased foreign 
aid  produce  large  welfare  returns.  Long-term  growth  projections  are  particularly  impressive  under  the 
hypothetical ―big push‖ option—significant increases in foreign aid—and much lower under the reduced 
interest payments on external debt alternative. Still, even under the hypothetical ―big push,‖ the composition 
of public spending allocation matters. The fully capital expenditure expansion results in consistently higher 
growth rates, further highlighting the critical role of public investments for long-run growth in the region. 
Future  research  will  explore  the  interaction  between  public  capital  accumulation  and  long-term  debt 
indicators in the region.  
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Average growth 
rates of real GDP 
per capita
Total years to 
double real GDP 
per capita
Baseline  0.80 86
EXPERIMENT 1
Foreign interest rates are 50 % lower
Experiment 1A (all allocated to CG) 0.97 72
Experiment 1B (all allocated to IG) 0.99 70
Experiment 1C (50% allocated to IG, 50% allocated to CG) 0.98 71
EXPERIMENT 2
Foreign aid is 10 % of GDP
Experiment 2A (all allocated to CG) 1.07 65
Experiment 2B (all allocated to IG) 1.23 57
Experiment 2C (50% allocated to IG, 50% allocated to CG) 1.14 61
Foreign aid is 12 % of GDP
Experiment 2D (all allocated to CG) 1.19 59
Experiment 2E (all allocated to IG) 2.04 35
Experiment 2F (50% allocated to IG, 50% allocated to CG) 1.61 43
Foreign aid is 15 % of GDP
Experiment 2G (all allocated to CG) 1.37 51
Experiment 2H (all allocated to IG) 3.15 23
Experiment 2I (50% allocated to IG, 50% allocated to CG) 2.26 31
Table 1
Ethiopia: Total years needed to double the real GDP per capita21 
 
Figure 1: Sub-Saharan Africa – External Debt Stocks (in billions of current U.S. dollars) 
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Figure 3: GDP per capita in China versus HIPCs in Sub-Saharan Africa  
(in constant 2000 U.S. dollars) 
 
   24 
 
Figure 4: Experiment 1 - Real GDP per capita growth 
































































































Experiment 1A (all allocated to CG)
Experiment 1B (all allocated to IG)
Experiment 1C (50% allocated to IG, 50% allocated to CG)25 
 
Figure 5: Experiment 2 - Real GDP per capita growth 
(higher foreign aid; deviation from baseline) 
 




























































































Foreign aid is 12 % of GDP
Experiment 2D (all allocated to CG)
Experiment 2E (all allocated to IG)




























































































Foreign aid is 15 % of GDP
Experiment 2G (all allocated to CG)
Experiment 2H (all allocated to IG)




Figure 1A: GDP per capita in Emerging Markets of Asia versus HIPCs in Sub-Saharan Africa  
(in constant 2000 US dollars) 
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ANNEX - Table 1A 
Calibrated or Imposed Parameters 
 
Parameter  Value 
KL  0.60 
D  0.13 
Y  0.85 
DM  0.72 
ʱPD  0.600 
PD  0.300 
RM  0.760 
ʴP  0.040 
ʴG  0.025 
σD  0.300 
σDM  0.300 
σKL   0.400 
σY  0.500 
Note: The parameter values are taken from Agénor, Bayraktar,  
and El Aynaoui (2008). 
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